Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers, Government by Deal, and the Private Equity Implosion

Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers, Government by Deal, and the Private Equity Implosion

Steven M. Davidoff

Language: English

Pages: 365

ISBN: 0470431296

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


An engaging exploration of modern-day deals and deal-making

Gods at War details the recent deals and events that have forever changed the world of billion-dollar deal-making. This book is a whirlwind tour of the players determining the destiny of corporate America, including the government, private equity, strategic buyers, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds.

It not only examines many of the game-changing takeover events that have occurred in the past years, but also puts them into context and exposes what is really going on behind the scenes on Wall Street. Gods at War completely covers the strategic issues that guide the modern-day deal, and since they unfold under the shadow of the law, it also focuses on the legal aspects of deal-making and takeovers.

  • Each chapter unfolds through the lens of a recent transaction, from the battle between Yahoo! and Microsoft to the United Rental/Cerberus dispute
  • Provides in-depth explanations and analysis of the events and actors that have shaped this fast-moving field
  • Examines the federal government's regulation by deal approach to saving the financial system and explains the government's biggest "deals", including its bail-outs of AIG, Bank of America, and Citigroup

Filled with in-depth insights that will enhance your understanding of this field, Gods at War offers an engaging look at deals and deal-makers in the context of recent historical events. It's a book for those who want to understand deals, takeovers, and the people and institutions who shape our world.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

highly accurate information about the likely voting outcome and, based on that information, acts to influence the vote.” See Yair Listokin, “Management Always Wins the Close Ones,” American Law and Economics Review (forthcoming). 70 See Edward B. Rock, “Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work,” 44 U. C.L.A. Law Review 1009 (1997) 71 Bebchuk et al., “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards.” 72 Ibid.; Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards,”

Annual meeting of shareholders Antitrust regulation Apollo Management L.P. Appraisal rights Archibald, Nolan Ashland Inc. Asian merger and acquisition activity Asset purchase Auction theory Azerbaijani fund B Back-end merger Bailouts creep Basic Capital LLC Bair, Sheila Ballmer, Stephen A. Banco Santander SA Bancroft family Bank of America Corporation bailout Bank of China Bankruptcy Chapter Chapter Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005

action.27 • Diminished Regulation and Longer Term Operational Focus. Private equity allowed firms to operate outside the glare of the public markets. While the benefits to the public markets existed in increased access to financing, liquidity, and analyst and other disclosure coverage, they also subjected the public corporation to litigation exposure, disclosure costs, and other costs associated with regulatory supervision. A private corporation eliminated a measure of these costs.28 It also

harming itself.58 It was a clear lesson in a judging tendency to rule with regard to political reality. Parsons quite wisely was not about to be the one blamed for upsetting the entirety of the global capital market by challenging the federal government and allowing Bear Stearns’s possible failure. The case against Bear Stearns fizzled out after that. The plaintiffs saw the impediments to halting the transaction, withdrew their preliminary injunction motion before the New York court, and decided

continue to be the area where dealmakers look to soar. These deals will continue to be viewed as battles, where the barbarians at the gate can surmount a target’s defenses and win the prize. Hostiles will thus be the area of takeover where personality continues to dominate and uneconomic takeovers are more likely to occur. This is particularly true because buyers have essentially unfettered freedom to engage in these takeovers. Nonetheless, the question remains whether the good governance trend

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