Financial Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft Depression of the 21st Century
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"History shows that people who save and invest grow and prosper, and the others deteriorate and collapse.
As Financial Reckoning Day demonstrates, artificially low interest rates and rapid credit creation policies set by Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve caused the bubble in U.S. stocks of the late '90s. . . . Now, policies being pursued at the Fed are making the bubble worse. They are changing it from a stock market bubble to a consumption and housing bubble.
And when those bubbles burst, it's going to be worse than the stock market bubble . . .
No one, of course, wants to hear it. They want the quick fix. They want to buy the stock and watch it go up twenty-five percent because that's what happened last year, and that's what they say on TV."
—Jim Rogers, author of the bestseller Adventure Capitalist
from the Foreword to Financial Reckoning Day
Advanced praise from bestselling authors
"An investment book that will not only enlarge your investment horizon, but also make you laugh and thoroughly entertain you for a few hours."
—Dr. Marc Faber, author of the bestseller Tomorrow's Gold
"Financial Reckoning Day is . . . in the category of scintillating sex or good vision, something to be savored and enjoyed-before it is too late."
—James Dale Davidson, author of the bestseller The Great Reckoning and The Sovereign Individual
"A powerful and insightful vision . . . each paragraph stimulates a new rush of thoughts that fills in gaping holes in the investor's understanding of what has happened to their dreams . . . while prepping them to confront any new confusion that may arrive."
—Martin D. Weiss, author of the bestseller Crash Profits
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A L R E C K O N I N G D AY only techies, terrorists, and teenagers were still awake, the world’s dark fibers would light up with data. And maybe then, Global Crossing’s stock would rise . . . to 3 cents! Dreamers and Schemers W e might laugh, but Gilder, the messiah of the New Era, was still in the wilderness, and who can fault him for that? After all he did no harm. As in every revolution, the real mischief was done by the small cadre of cynical gunrunners who followed in their messiah’s
could crowd onto the head of a silicon chip. Worse, in January 2002, came the news that his favorite corporation—the company he thought would “change the world economy”—had filed for bankruptcy protection. Gilder ref lected on his fortunes over those past few years: “ You can be just fabulously f lush one moment, and then the next, you can’t make that last million-dollar payment to your partners, and there’s suddenly a lien on your house . . . For a few years in a row there, I was the best
associates. . . . After a few moments’ conversation, the Count d’Horn suddenly sprang upon his victim and stabbed him three times in the breast with a poniard. The man fell heavily to the ground, and, while the Count was employed in rif ling his portfolio of bonds in the Mississippi and Indian schemes to the amount of 100,000 crowns, Mille, the Piedmontese, stabbed the unfortunate broker again and again, to make sure of his death. But the broker did not fall without a struggle . . . and his cries
monetary system, saying “ We have a technology called a printing press.” But, despite his assurances that def lation was no problem, Greenspan’s sleep must have been disturbed in the fall of 2002 by thoughts of “turning Tu r n i n g J a p a n e s e Japanese.” The mainstream press had taken up the idea and his staff economists were offering solutions. What became of Mieno, Greenspan must have asked himself ? For instead of being “extraordinarily remote,” the risk of def lation was, in fact,