China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996

China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996

Language: English

Pages: 593

ISBN: 2:00363387

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

In the past sixty years, relations between China and the United States have fluctuated wildly. Such divisive issues as human rights, the future of Tibet and Taiwan, trade imbalances, and illegal immigration have fueled intense debate over how the United States should deal with the most populous nation in the world.

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker brings together a wide range of interviews on these and other issues, recorded by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, with key players in the making and execution of U.S. policy towards China since World War II. Historical events usch as Nixon's trip to China, the Tiananmen Massacre, and the recurring Taiwan Straits crises come to life as never before. Portraits of the essential personalities in Sino-American relations emerge from the pages of China Confidential, including Mao Zedong, Henry Kissinger, Zhou Enlai, Ronald Reagan, Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Lee Teng-hui.

This rich array of interviews provides the context for understanding the otherwise baffling diplomatic interaction between the United States and China, shedding light on the circumstances under which difficult and crucial decisions were reached and revealing the background and biases of the people who made and carried out those policies.











University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. China confidential : American diplomats and Sino-American relations since  / Nancy Bernkopf Tucker p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN ––– (acid free paper) — ISBN ––– (pbk. : acid-free paper) . United States—Foreign relations—China. . China—Foreign relations—United States. . United States—Foreign relations—–. . United

maintain themselves in Manchuria. They had Shenyang and Changchun, several cities, but the countryside was mostly controlled by the Communists. He felt they simply couldn’t keep their supply lines open, which turned out to be the case. Gradually they lost the battle for Manchuria and then the battle for North China.14 But we could see it coming, you know. We’d go into the embassy and our Military Attaché would put a map up and give us a briefing on the latest military situation. Any layman could

as a way to keep in touch with a very important adversary of ours at that period, with the hope that the 98 1950s effort to at least promote a more peaceful atmosphere in the Taiwan Strait would be successful. I don’t know what Dulles had in mind as sort of long term, whether he thought these might lead eventually to a diplomatic relationship with Beijing. He might have. : By , the Chinese had become fed up with the lack of progress on Taiwan. This coincided with powerful

their foreign policies, and that the first evidences of the split between Moscow and Peking occurred in  after the Sputnik was put up, and when the Chinese sent two delegations to Moscow to try to benefit and participate in this breakthrough, getting certain kinds of technical support from the Russians. But the Russians gave them the cold shoulder. : The first sign of [a rift] was in , during the anniversary of Lenin’s birthday. In Beijing’s media, out comes this big editorial on

Begins I  s  s, Americans dealt with a China riven by civil war and foreign intervention. As communists labored to seize and transform China, the Japanese sought to expand their empire on the mainland of Asia. Complicating the situation further, the government of China under Chiang Kai-shek appeared increasingly ineffective, corrupt, and uncooperative. Although the American public tended to be apathetic toward foreign relations and ignorant about Asia, the United States had no

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